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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
BABY GIRL MARIE, a person under 
eighteen years of age; 
NADINE MUNOZ, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 14599 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN ANSWER TO RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal from Judgment of the First District Juvenile Court, 
Weber County, The Honorable Charles E. Bradford presiding. 
The Appellant, Nadine Munoz, by and through her attorney of 
record James R. Hasenyager, hereby respectfully asks that Respondent's 
Petition For Rehearing of the above-entitled cause of action be denied 
for the reasons set out in Appellant's accompanying brief, herein 
incorporated by reference. 
WHEREFORE, Appellant asks that Respondent's Petition For 
Rehearing be denied. 
DATED th is s / / f f i d aY of A p r i l , 1977. 
/JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
At torney for Appel lant 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT HAS BEEN AFFORDED A FAIR HEARING IN THIS CASE 
BECAUSE THE COMPLETE RECORD WITH ACCOMPANYING BRIEFS OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES WAS BEFORE THE COURT AND THE ORAL ARGUMENT 
ITSELF WAS PRESERVED ELECTRONICALLY. 
Respondent asserts that it was improper for a successor Justice 
who was not physically present at oral argument to participate in the 
decision of this case. This assertion has two clear and fundamental 
errors. 
First, there has been no showing, nor even the allegation, that 
the record before the court in this case was in any way inadequate or 
incomplete as a basis upon which the court could make a review and render 
its decision. Nor has there been a showing that any arguments or legal 
propositions raised by either counsel in the oral argument itself were 
not fully presented in the record or the respective briefs of the parties. 
For review purposes, the record of prior judicial proceedings 
along with the accompanying legal briefs of the respective parties are 
the important items which the court reviews in reaching its decision of 
any case. Indeed, it is recognized that when a complete record along 
with the briefs of the parties are presented to the court for review, 
oral arguments are generally not necessary. Respondent's argument fails 
in this respect because the full record, as well as legal briefs of the 
parties were available for review by Mr. Justice Hall in reaching his 
decision in this case. 
-1-
The issue of a successor justice at the appellate level does 
not present the problems traditionally associated with a successor judge 
at the trial court level. There were no witnesses, no testimony to be 
subjected to a credibility test, and no jury. Bangor and Aroostock Rail-
road Company vs. Brotherhood of Locomotive, Firemen and Engineers, 314 
F. Supp. 352, at 355, 356 (1970). In the instant case, with a full and 
complete record before the court Mr. Justice Hall had the necessary 
information upon which he could make his review and render his decision 
in this case. The assertions of the respondent notwithstanding, review 
is of necessity predicated almost exclusively on the record and briefs 
filed with the court in a particular case. The respondent is in a very 
shaky position asserting that it was prejudiced by the resignation of 
Mr. Justice Henriod and the participation of Mr. Justice Hall in the 
decision of this case. However, when coupled with the electronic recor-
dation of the oral argument by the court itself, the respondent simply 
has no position at all# 
Oral argument was held on November 11, 1976, at which time 
counsel for both the appellant and the respondent presented their cases 
to the court. At that time, oral argument was recorded electronically 
and a record of that session was preserved. The recording was in exist-
ence and available for rehearing if any members of the court later 
desired to listen to that session. Cases cited to the court by the 
respondent are not only not on point to the issue raised by the respon-
dent but are also forty years old as well. Cordner v. Cordner, 64 P.2d 
828, primarily relied on by respondent, is a 1937 case. It makes little 
sense for the court to not recognize and incorporate into the efficient 
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administration of its judicial business the accuracy and quality of mod-
ern electronic recordation equipment. In the instant case a full and 
complete record was before the court for review; the oral argument was 
preserved and available for use by the court in reaching its decision; 
the respondent's position is not well taken and should be rejected. 
POINT II 
IMPECUNIOSITY, ABSENT ADDITIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, WILL NOT 
SUPPORT A DECREE OF TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER 
SECTION 55-10-109, U.C.A. 1953, AS AMENDED. 
Respondent has alleged that the court reached an improper con-
clusion of law when the court stated on page two of the original decision 
that !lImpecuniosity will not support a termination decree." Respondent 
further urges on the court the proposition that impecuniosity standing 
alone will support a termination decree. It is difficult to conceive a 
position more violative of an individual's equal protection and due 
process guarantees under both our Federal and State Constitutions. Con-
trary to respondent's assertions, this court has never taken the position 
that impecuniosity absent other additional circumstances would support a 
decree of termination. In all of the cases cited to this court by the 
respondent, indeed, in all of the cases decided by this court in which a 
decree of termination was upheld, there were additional circumstances 
which contributed to the termination decree to provide a totality of 
circumstances warranting termination. Those additional circumstances 
have included emotional instability of the parent, In re State in the 
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Interest of Jennings, 20 Ut. 2d 50, 432 P.2d 879 (1967); a killing of 
the mother by the father in the presence of the children, In re State in 
the Interest of Mullins, 29 Ut. 2d 376, 510 P.2d 720 (1973); inadequate 
parental supervisory skills, poor housekeeping and low moral standards 
of the mother, State in the Interest of T. G., 532 P.2d 997 (1975); aban-
donment, State in the Interest of Summers Children, 560 P.2d 331 (1977); 
and, where the home was clearly inadequate and the parents could not or 
would not correct the evils which existed in the home, Inez Pilling et 
al vs. Donna Lance, 23 Ut£d 407, 464 P.2d 395 (1970). Not a single case 
supports the position of the respondent. As this court properly pointed 
out, impecuniosity, standing alone, will at best support only a finding 
of dependency before the juvenile court. In the instant case, none of 
these additional circumstances were present. 
Respondent has conveniently chosen to ignore a central fact of 
this case in that the appellant was a juvenile at the time of the orig-
inal termination decree and was impecunious only because of the temporary 
status in being a juvenile. This type of disability, not of the appel-
lants making and the only one present in this case, is alleviated very 
simply through the passage of a short period of time; a circumstance 
which had been adequately met by the Juvenile Court's original order of 
November 6, 1974, placing the child in the temporary custody of the 
Department of Family Services with review in one year. 
It would be a major step backwards in the development of the 
law of this State if this court were to reverse its original holding that 
11
 Impecuniosity will not support a termination decree.11 Appellant urges 
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the court to categorically reject the proposition that impecuniosity 
absent other circumstances will support a termination decree, 
POINT III 
DISSATISFACTION WITH THE COURT'S HOLDING IS NOT A PROPER 
BASIS TO SEEK A REHEARING AND RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING SHOULD BE DENIED. 
The essence of respondent's final argument is that the respon-
dent is not satisfied with the court's conclusion in its original deci-
sion. Respondent has asserted that the court failed to consider the 
issues raised by Points I and VI of respondent's original brief: to-wit, 
that the juvenile court had no jurisdiction to vacate its previously 
entered order and that the welfare of the child and findings of the 
juvenile court in relation thereto are of paramount consideration on 
review by this court. However, respondent ignores the holding of this 
court in its original decision of February 24, 1977, that the juvenile 
court lacked the jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of the 
appellant in the first place; that the juvenile court, a statutory court 
of limited jurisdiction, may only terminate a person's parental rights 
when it strictly follows fla clearly expressed statutory standard,,! Deci-
sion, February 24, 1977, page 3; and that the original order of the 
juvenile court in this matter was void. Respondent appears to be sug-
gesting that no matter how carelessly and error-ridden a juvenile court's 
initial termination proceeding may be, if the State or adoption agency 
can act quickly enough in bringing the matter before the district court 
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on an adoption action, that all prior defects committed by the juvenile 
court in the original termination are cured. Clearly, the law will not 
sustain such a position, and of equal clarity is that this court has not 
ignored Point I of respondents initial brief. 
On the issue of an intervening adoption proceeding, the major-
ity opinion notes in footnote number 2, page 3 of the original decision 
filed February 24, 1977: 
2. Also see 46 Am. Jur.2d, Judgments, Section 752, 
P. 915: ,f. . . the defense of laches has been 
regarded as not available against a motion to 
open or vacate a void judgment, for the reason 
that no amount of acquiescense can make it 
valid . . . . There may be some instances, how-
ever, under which laches or delay may be asserted 
to preclude relief, as where others innocently 
relied on the record of the judgment. 
Additionally, the last paragraph of the majority opinion expresses the 
recognition by the majority that this case was not an easy decision to 
be made in light of the personal interest involved. There the court cor-
rectly characterized the original error-ridden termination proceeding as 
!la tragic example which results from a failure to adhere to a clearly 
expressed statutory standard.If Decision, February 24, 1977, page 3. 
Clearly, the court in reaching its decision in this case did consider 
the personal interests involved. 
Point III of respondent's petition for a rehearing is in sub-
stance an emotional appeal grounded upon dissatisfaction with the courtfs 
conclusion. Such an argument does not meet the standard for a rehearing 
set out by the court in the old case of In re McKnight, 4 Ut. 237, 9 P. 
299 (1886) or that of Brown v. Pickard, 4 Ut. 292, 11 P. 512 wherein the 
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court stated: 
The appellant moves for a rehearing. He alleges 
that . . . the court erred in its conclusions. 
Nothing is now submitted as a reason why a rehear-
ing should be granted that was not fully considered 
in the argument. No showing is made that satisfies 
the court that it should review its conclusions, 
and we are not convinced that we erred. We long 
ago laid down the rule that, to justify a rehearing, 
a strong case must be made. We must be convinced 
that the court failed to consider some material 
point in the case, or that it erred in its conclu-
sions, or that some matter has been discovered which 
was unknown at the time of hearing. Venard v. Old 
Hickory M & S. Co.,7 Pac. Rep. 408. Where a case 
has been fully and fairly considered in all its bear-
ings, a rehearing will be denied. People v. Rogerson, 
7 Pac, Rep. 410. 
All of the issues raised by respondent in Point III of their petition for 
rehearing were before the court in its original decision, were considered 
by the court in its original decision, and respondents petition should 
therefore be denied. Arguments presented by respondent are in effect re-
argument of respondents original brief. When this is the case, the 
petition should properly be denied. Dredge Corp. v. Husite Co., 369 P.2d 
676. 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENT HAS INCLUDED IMPROPER STATEMENTS IN ITS BRIEF 
WHICH SHOULD BE STRICKEN. 
Appellant takes exception to, as improperly included in respon-
dent's brief on petition for rehearing, the reference to a March 4, 1977, 
letter to the Salt Lake Tribune from a child psychiatrist quoted in res-
pondent's brief for a rehearing. Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, 
page 18. Appellant asserts that it is in effect an attempt to influence 
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the court through the introduction of what the respondent is obviously 
characterizing as expert testimony. Such an attempt is improper as 
review is predicated upon the record of this case as previously estab-
lished, not upon an opinion generated outside the judicial process, and 
this reference should be stricken from respondents brief. 
Lastly, appellant asks that the first sentence of repondentfs 
conclusion, Respondents Petition for Rehearing, page 19, be stricken 
as well. This is not legal argument proper for consideration by the 
court in a petition for rehearing, rather it is an attempt at an inflam-
matory emotional appeal directed solely at dissatisfaction with the 
court?s original decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the respondent has been afforded a 
fair hearing in the decision of this case; that the court has not erred 
as to either fact or conclusions of law; and that respondent's petition 
is based solely upon dissatisfaction with the conclusion of the court1s 
original decision. All issues raised by the respondent were considered 
by the court in its original determination. 
Therefore, appellant respectfully asks that respondent's 
petition for rehearing be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES R. HASENYAGER 
Attorney for Appellant 
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